Organization and Cohesion
Little is known about the organization of the CPN-M, which has been underground from the very beginning. One fact is evident, the Maoist leadership, as is the case among Nepal's major political parties, is dominated by the Bahuns, the same caste which is historically criticized for discrimination and exclusion in Nepal. Maoists began their war with a few looted rifles and home-made explosives. In the past three years, the Maoists have become able to snatch away a sizable amount of sophisticated weapon from the army. Official sources claim that the Maoists have purchased modern automatic weapons from relatively easy weapon market in India, which is yet to be substantiated. The Maoists have been financing their war through bank looting, and forced and voluntary donations. One estimate puts the Maoist treasury well above Nepali rupees 5 billion.
Many of the Maoist affected areas are inhabited by a large number of well-trained retired Indian and British Armies. Authorities suspect that some of these retirees might be providing training to Maoist guerrillas. While no one knows exactly the number of guerrillas, it is believed that there are 5000 to 8000 "hard core" fighters. This figure does not include "part-time" guerillas, who stay with their communities offering secret services both to the political and military wings of the party. In their announcement and published documents, the Maoists often refer to "companies," "battalions" and "squads." The Maoists depicted their strength as one of the "strategic balance" in early 2001; this means that the Maoists consider themselves as equal in strength to the government forces. Highly efficient attacks in recent years indicate that the Maoists indeed have already developed a sophisticated military organization.
Further, the Maoists have succeeded to woo a vast numbers of cadres from Nepal's largest communist party, CPN-United Marxist and Leninist and other small communist factions. Sister organizations like women, student, peasant, and worker organizations are the part and parcel of party propaganda. In fact, the Maoist "cultural organization" is one of the most powerful propaganda organs of the party. The organization "educates" Nepal's vastly illiterate rural peasantry about the sophisticated political ideology through "cultural programs."
Maoists time and again announce shadow local and district level governments in their strongholds. Finally, it is worth noting that, in 2001, the Maoists announced their own "people's government" headed by Nepal's legendary intellectual and one of the architects of the people's war, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. The detail of the fate of this government and its modus operandi is yet to be known. So far as the organizational cohesion is concerned, the Maoists in their formal announcements claim that the party's organization is under the firm control of the party leadership and that there is no division and defection in the party. But observers in Kathmandu claim that the leadership of the party has passed from "political commissars" to "military commanders." This perspective claims that there is a general loss of control of the Maoist high command over their cadres. It should be mentioned however that there are no signs of visible effects of this supposed transformation of the party leadership.
Popular Support
A look at the "40-point Demand" presented by the Maoists to the then Nepali Congress government weeks before they launched their war in 1996 helps to locate the Maoist strategy to win support from the people. The Maoists demanded that Nepal should be declared a secular state, all languages should be given equal status and "local autonomy" should be granted on the basis of ethnicity. Similarly, they demanded an "once and for all" end to caste based exploitation and equal property rights to women. Their demands stated that the land of rich landlords should be confiscated and distributed to the homeless and landless. Their demands further included the abrogation of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty as well as the Mahakali river water sharing treaty with India.
These demands represent the popular grievances expressed by Nepal's ethnic groups, the poor, women, the "untouchables," and the peasants in general. The abrogation of the 1950 Indo-Nepal and Mahakali water sharing treaties were obviously directed at Nepal's urban elites. The Maoists have been using every opportunity to show the public that they are the ones who take up the peoples' grievances seriously. In rural areas, current Maoist activities include helping the local people build wells, trails and irrigation canals, and holding courts to dispense immediate "justice." Obviously, Maoists have included every segment of the Nepali society that resents the current state of the affairs in the country.
External Support
It seems that the Maoists have succeeded at every front, but in the area of external support, their position seems precarious. Nepal's immediate neighbors, India and China, have denounced the insurgency. China has always distanced itself from Nepal's internal politics. So none of the governments, immediate or far afield, has supported the Maoists morally, politically and materially. The "international factor" is greatly debated among those Nepal's communist parties, which have taken part in the country's constitutional process. Many of the parties accept the political aim and even the means of the Maoists, but they disagree with them on the ground that the "international climate" is not "conducive" to the ultimate victory.
The Maoists have fraternity with Maoist organizations throughout the world. The Revolutionary International Movement (RIM) frequently issues statements supporting Maoists and criticizing the Nepali government. Currently, there are a number of violent Maoist movements in India. It is widely believed that Nepal's Maoists get training and even arm support from these organizations. Similarly, media speculations link Maoists to the "terrorists" organizations in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. But nothing has been substantiated so far. It is widely believed that Nepal's Maoists operate from their bases in India. So, one view among Nepal's politicians, journalists and even academicians is that India is "helping" the
Maoists clandestinely to destabilize Nepal. Nepal's unique geopolitical situation has attracted the attention of world powers from the very beginning. The United States prominently features in Nepal's current mess. In fact, the Maoists squarely blamed the failure of the last talks with government to the United States. In October this year, the US government froze "Maoist assets" in the US. In short, Nepal's Maoists have failed abysmally to garner external support; this alone puts their ambition in serious jeopardy.
Government Response
When Maoists presented their 40-point demands on February 4, 1996, the then Nepali Congress government did not respond. In the early days of the insurgency, successive governments viewed the Maoists as a "law and order problem." The government in mid-1998 began the infamous "Kilo Sierra 2" operation against the Maoists and their supporters. Many attribute much of the Maoist sympathy today to the police high-handedness during the infamous operation. The Royal Nepal Army, which staunchly supports Nepal's King, publicly refused to go to the battlefield before the state of emergency was declared in 2001. This also raised questions of Nepal's civilian government's authority over the military. The debate between the King and the parliament has led some scholars to term Nepal's present politics as the classic "king-versus-parliament" politics. Hence, not only did the successive governments respond lightly to the crisis initially, but also it could not mobilize its security organs effectively.
Nepal saw a highly unstable politics in the 1990s. Intra and inter-party feuds was the hallmark of the period. Visionless governments came and went in quick successions, further alienating the people and exacerbating the problem. This seriously affected the government's action against the Maoists. The historical acrimony between the dominant Nepali Congress and the left parties further crated fertile lands for the Maoists to play off one against another. Political parties differed in their approaches to the problems.
Most serious of all, however, was the successive governments' reliance on an armed solution. Hence, they focused on smart weapons rather than economic development and social justice. In the meantime, Nepal's King took executive power on his own hand in November 2002, and instituted a puppet "interim" government. Currently, Nepal's mainstream political parties have gone to the streets against King's decision. This has further complicated the situation. In short, Nepali state's response has been utterly short-sighted and superficial, which only helped - is helping - fuel the insurgency.
Conclusion
Looking at the six variables discussed above, it becomes obvious that Nepal's social, economic, geographical and political conditions have been conducive to the emergence and the sustenance of the insurgency. The Maoists have developed effective political and military organizations within a short period. Astutely formulated "demands" have ensured popular support; the government's response only helped alienate the people. It seems the Maoist are close to their goal. But, external support is the key.
Nepal's unique geopolitical situation - a land locked country between two aspiring military powers (India and China) - has historically drawn attention of the world's great powers. International support is crucial for both the Maoists and government. The "post-September 11" world has further put the Maoists at a disadvantage. Successive governments in Kathmandu have tried to link the Maoist insurgency to the US led "war against terrorism;" they continue to receive military and financial assistance from the US, the UK, India and China. Without any external support, it is unlikely that Maoists will win the war in the foreseeable future. It seems that there is a real possibility of a protracted war. This does not augur well for one of the world's poorest countries.
The Maoists sat for talks with the government twice. But no tangible results have come out so far. The insurgency has precipitated a massive political vacuum in Nepal. Nepal's "democracy" at present is without people's representatives, both at the local and the parliament level. The Constitution of Nepal 1990, touted as one of the "best in the world", has come under serious stress. The war now has turned a "three way" contest - political parties Vs Maoists Vs monarchy. One thing is evident, however; the face of Nepal won't remain the same in the future. Although the cost has been heavy, the insurgency has generated a massive political consciousness among the people of Nepal. Whether the Maoists win or lose, this massive consciousness will affect the future course of Nepali society tremendously.
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